A RESOURCE UNIT FOR A HIGH SCHOOL AMERICAN HISTORY CLASS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE UNITED STATES INTO WORLD WAR I

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by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. The purpose of this project was to develop a resource unit for use in teaching the development of the United States international relations from the Spanish-American War to the entrance of the United States into World War I. This unit on international relations covers a four-week period in an eleventh-grade American history class.

Justification of the resource unit. It was necessary to determine whether a resource unit on United States international relations from 1898 to 1917 would be of value in the teaching of history. In surveying curriculum and methods texts and professional periodicals, it was found that few units of work had been developed in this area. Also, there has been much recent research reported on the period from 1898 to 1914. It was therefore concluded that the preparation of this resource unit was a worthy project.

One of the greatest problems facing the world today is that of establishing world order. Wishful thinking is not sufficient to achieve this result. Wise decisions about international relations and international agencies must be

based upon an understanding of the causes of wars and of the ways in which various types of national and international action have worked out in the past. The problem of preventing war is not an academic one for high school students. It is one which they recognize to be of the utmost importance for their own future. It is important, therefore, that each student have a good understanding of the United States basic foreign policy of the past so that he may understand and help shape American foreign policy of today.

II. PROCEDURE

There are two generally accepted types of units today. These are the resource unit, and the teaching unit.[1] The resource unit usually differs from the teaching unit in several respects--in purpose, scope, inception, and organization.

The advantages of a resource unit over a teaching unit are:

> (1) It contains many more suggestions than can be used by any one class; (2) it covers a broad area from which materials can be drawn for the study of specific topics or problems; (3) it gives a number of possibilities for achieving the same objective; and (4) it is not organized as a classroom teaching guide.[2]

A resource unit encompasses a given area of learning.

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[1]Edgar B. Wesley and Stanley P. Wronski, Teaching Social Studies in High Schools (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1958), p. 382.

[2]I. James Quillen and Lavone A. Hanna, Education for Social Competence (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1948), p. 186.

In it there are detailed listings of objectives, principles, procedures, methods, reference materials, and suggestions for evaluation. The scope of the resource unit is always more inclusive than that of the teaching unit. It is so extensive that the teacher is not expected to deal with all of its contents, nor utilize all of the suggested student activities. It should act as a guide for the teacher to make his own teaching unit with the information available in the resource unit.

There are many ways to organize resource units but they all incorporate, in some form or another: (1) title, (2) subject matter content, and (3) teaching aids.[1]

A suggested way of organization is found in the textbook entitled Teaching Social Studies in High School by Edgar B. Wesley and Stanley P. Wronski. The proposed content is as follows:

Title
- I. Overview of the unit
- II. Objectives to be sought from the unit
- III. Contents of the unit
- IV. Unit procedures
  - A. Initiatory activities
  - B. Developmental activities
  - C. Culminating activities
- V. Materials to be used
  - A. Reading materials
    1. Bibliography for the teacher
    2. Bibliography for the students
  - B. Audio-visual materials
- VI. Evaluating the unit
  - A. In terms of objectives
  - B. Specific test and measuring instruments
  - C. Informal evaluation techniques.[2]

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[1] Wesley, loc. cit.

[2] Ibid., p. 385.

The organization followed in the preparation of this unit will be that presented above.

Before attempting to write this resource unit, numerous high school history texts were surveyed. It was found that the treatment of the history of the development of United States international relations from the Spanish American War to the entrance of United States into World War I was inadequate as presented in these texts. This necessitated delving into college texts to develop a broader treatment of the subject.

A broad general background was needed to familiarize the author with the area to be covered. The four texts selected for the background materials were: Shaping of American Diplomacy by William Williams,[1] A Diplomatic History of the United States by Samuel Bemis,[2] A Diplomatic History of the American People by Thomas Bailey,[3] and Documents of American History by Henry Commager.[4]

The main objective in the writing of this unit was

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[1]William Appleman Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1956).

[2]Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1955).

[3]Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: F.S. Crofts and Company, 1946).

[4]Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, Inc., 1958).

to give the students a sufficient background of the major events in the diplomatic history of the United States during the years 1898 to 1917. To do this a number of high school texts were surveyed to see how the authors covered this area in the field of history. It was then decided to combine the good points of each of these texts into one complete and precise unit.

Organization of the resource unit. Chapter II of this report is the resource unit for the teaching of the development of United States international relations from the Spanish American War to the entrance of the United States into World War I.

The organization of content is as follows:

Title
- I. Overview of the unit
- II. Objectives to be sought from the unit
- III. Contents of the unit
- IV. Unit procedures
  - A. Initiatory activities
  - B. Developmental activities
  - C. Culminating activities
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  - A. Reading materials
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  - B. Audio-visual materials
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  - A. In terms of objectives
  - B. Specific test and measuring instruments
  - C. Informal evaluation techniques.

Overview of the unit. The purpose of the overview is to provide the teacher or student with a brief survey of

the total learning situation involved in the unit.

Objectives to be sought from the unit. A unit should have a list of objectives or goals which the students can work for. It should serve as a guide to be followed by the teacher and student. It is what a teacher hopes to accomplish with a given resource unit.

Contents of the unit. The content of the unit is a narrative presentation of the subject matter of the unit.

Unit procedures. "Initiatory activities" are designed to motivate the student to study the unit. The general purpose of any initiatory activity is to launch the new unit in such a way as to enlist the utmost enthusiasm and intellectual curiosity of the student.

"Developmental activities" serve to help achieve unit objectives, provide variety in order to maintain interest and provide for individual differences in abilities and interests.

As the unit draws to a close there is need for a "concluding activities" that tie together past understandings and give the students an opportunity to see the unity and coherence of the problem area they have investigated. Such culminating activities are intended to reinforce the students' past learning. They are planned and carried out on the basis of joint decisions by students and the teacher.

Materials to be used. One of the most useful and practical sections of any resource unit is its listings of materials. The busy classroom teacher cannot be expected to know of all the possible types of materials available for use and the sources from which they can be obtained. The well-prepared resource unit will give him leads and references. The materials section should contain written, audio, and visual resource materials for both the students and the teacher.

Evaluating the unit. The evaluation of the unit should take into consideration the unit objectives: understandings, skills and attitudes. A means for measuring each of these areas has to be developed.

CHAPTER II

THE RESOURCE UNIT

I. OVERVIEW OF THE UNIT

It was planned for this unit to place emphasis on the high points of American diplomacy from the Spanish-American War of 1898 to the First World War in Europe of 1914, with major emphasis placed on the reasons for United States entry into World War I in 1917.

Upon every citizen there rests a solemn obligation to inform himself of the basic foreign policy of the past so that he may help shape American foreign policy of today--his foreign policy--along constructive and farsighted lines.

An outline of the material to be included in the proposed unit follows:

I. American policy of imperialism
   - A. The Cuban Affair
   - B. Spanish-American War
   - C. The Philippines
   - D. Power of public opinion

II. United States influence in the Western Hemisphere
   - A. Monroe Doctrine
   - B. Panama
   - C. Agreement with Latin America

III. The United States in Eastern affairs

A. China

1. "Open-door"

2. Boxer revolt

B. Agreements signed

1. Four-Power Treaty

2. Nine-Power Treaty

IV. United States and World War I

A. Propaganda

B. Economic reasons

C. Close association with Great Britain

D. Submarine warfare

II. THE OBJECTIVES AND DESIRED OUTCOMES

Objectives. The study of this Unit should answer the following questions:

1. Why was the United States involved in the Cuban situation of 1898?
2. What were the causes of the Spanish-American War?
3. What effects did the Spanish-American War have on the United States?
4. What were the United States' methods of imperialism?
5. What were the United States' views towards Latin America?
6. What was the United States' position in Eastern affairs?

7. What events forced the United States into war with the Axis Powers?

Understandings. The following understandings should develop from use of the unit:

1. The very important role of public opinion in the formulation of American foreign policy.
2. There can be no enduring cooperation with other nations except by adjustment, which must be mutual.
3. The forces that tend to cause wars can be combatted successfully only if all nations will plan and work cooperatively towards peace.
4. In the formative years of the United States, the nation was so weak that involvement in European affairs would have been courting suicide.

Attitudes. The attitudes listed as follows would be desired outcomes from use of the unit:

1. A desire to live at peace with other nations and the determination to make a world organization succeed.
2. A willingness on the part of the people of the United States to study and understand why others, whose lives are different, think as they do.
3. The development of interests which will carry over to adult lives.

4. The development of more tolerance, by realizing that in complicated international situations, one side has never had a complete monopoly of what seems to be right.

III. CONTENT

The following information would be included in the content of the unit.

American Policy of Imperialism. The word imperialism carries the suggestion that force is employed both in establishing and maintaining domination over new areas. For this study of imperialism the United States in South America will receive major study. It must be remembered that not only was the United States acting as an imperialistic power but other countries in Europe also were interested in overseas expansion in the Nineteenth Century.

For more than a century the United States had followed a policy of isolation. This policy was shattered with startling suddenness by the Spanish-American War. The war grew out of American interest in Cuba.

In the summer and autumn of 1895, when the American public was being deeply aroused against Great Britain over the Venezuela boundary dispute, relations with Spain over the situation in Cuba were rapidly deteriorating. In February, 1895, the Cubans raised the standard of revolt

after seventeen years of oppressive peace. Two of the reasons were: (1) The harsh and inefficient Spanish rule; (2) The tariff legislation of the United States.

The Spanish were strict military rulers who collected high taxes and ruled with an iron hand over the people of Cuba. The Spanish also ran the Cuban government. The people of Cuba wanted to have a voice in their government because the Spanish collected taxes and most of the tax money was used in Spain, and little, if any, used in Cuba.[1]

The Wilson-Gorman Tariff (1894) placed a duty on raw sugar, greatly reduced the American market, and brought ruin on the expanded cane plantations and industries of Cuba. This caused great suffering to the mass of Cubans because most of them were laborers on the cane plantations. Many Americans were plantation owners.

The Cuban insurrectionists under the leadership of Maxima Gamex revived the guerrilla warfare. They slaughtered Spanish loyalists and destroyed cane fields, syrup mills and machinery. The actions were mostly against the Spanish but much American property was destroyed as well. The Spanish government sent General Valeriana Weyler and a large military force to Cuba, with a free hand to deal with the rebels.

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[1]Frank Lawrence Owsley, Oliver Perry Chitwood and H.C. Nixon, A Short History of the American People (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1952), p. 323.

Weyler ran a barbed wire entanglement across the eastern part of the island, in an effort to confine the insurrectionists to that area. This was more like a German concentration camp. This area was in a sweltering jungle, where the population was herded. Untold numbers died from disease, starvation and brutal treatment by the Spanish soldiers.[1] While the government of the United States was neutral, the American people were openly sympathetic with the Cuban revolutionists. Some of the reasons for this were:

1. The Yellow Press, led by Hearst's New York Journal, spread the stories of Weyler's brutalities, with exaggeration.
2. The Cubans wanted their independence and asked the United States to help.
3. The battleship Maine, on a "friendly" visit at Havana was blown up. One hundred fifty men were killed and sixty injured. The United States public blamed Spain for it, although never proven.
4. DeLome, the Spanish ambassador to the United States, wrote to a friend in Cuba that McKinley was a weak spineless politician, a "bidder for the admiration of the crowd." This DeLome letter was published in newspapers in the United States.

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[1] Ibid., p. 326.

War was declared on Spain. One of the main reasons was that the American public demanded it. This reason is emphasized in the book, The Man in the Street, by Thomas Bailey.[1] This book deals with the power of public opinion and its force, which is very great in a democratic government like that of the United States. In the war with Spain the hostilities were short and highly successful, despite the serious blunder made by the United States government in the conduct of the war.

The brunt of the war fell on the navy, which was well prepared for the emergency. It was the first test of the new steel navy, construction of which had been going forward since 1883. The first blow for Cuban independence was struck in the far-distant Philippines. Commodore Dewey's squadron, which was in Asiatic waters as a result of Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt's efforts, steamed from Hong Kong to Manila and destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Dewey was compelled to wait from May 1 until August 13 for reinforcements which enabled the American troops to capture the city of Manila. Meanwhile, Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley had established an effective blockade of all Cuban posts. There they trapped Admiral Cervera and his Spanish fleet in

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[1]Thomas Bailey, The Man in the Street (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948).

the Santiago harbor. This harbor was narrow and United States ships could not go in after them for fear of being sunk. However, the Spanish fleet was very weak compared to the United States fleet.

The campaign against Santiago was brief and decisive. Its two phases were: (1) the operations of the American expedition forces to the north and east of the city, and (2) the destruction of Cervera's fleet.[1]

On June 14, 1889, seventeen thousand troops under the command of General W.R. Shafter embarked at Tampa, Florida. Within three weeks General J.F. Kent's division had taken San Juan Hill, General H.W. Lawton's division had reached El Caney, and General Wheeler's cavalry, with the Rough Riders, had stormed Kettle Hill. Admiral Cervera, learning that the Americans controlled the heights above Santiago, made a desperate effort to escape. His entire fleet was destroyed, with the American casualties of one killed and sixteen wounded. On July 17 Santiago surrendered. A peace treaty was then signed. The chief clauses of the treaty which was finally signed on December 10 were: (1) the grant of Cuban independence and assumption of the Cuban debt by Spain; (2) the cession to the United States of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines; (3) the payment of the United States of

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[1]Leon H. Canfield and Howard B. Wilder, The Making of Modern America (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 619.

$20,000,000 for the Philippines.[1]

President McKinley encountered great difficulty in persuading the Senate to ratify the treaty.

As a consequence of its war with Spain the United States began to play a more vigorous part upon the world stage than at any previous period in its history. The United States issued the Platt Amendment to Cuba, which was as follows:

1. Cuba should never enter into any treaty or agreement with a foreign power that impaired or tended to impair its independence.
2. The Cuban government should contract no debt beyond the capacity of the ordinary reserves to pay.
3. The United States was empowered to intervene to preserve Cuban independence and to maintain a government that could preserve order.
4. Cuba was to sell or lease to the United States sites for necessary coaling stations and naval bases.[2]

The Spanish-American War left the United States with the problems of organization and ruling the territories surrendered by Spain. The United States had promised these provinces their independence but the United States felt that

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[1]William Faulkner, American Political and Social History (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, Inc., 1957) p. 14-16.

[2]Owsley, op. cit., p. 365.

these people were not ready to rule themselves. The United States did much to improve the conditions of Cuba. The sick and the hungry were cared for, streets were cleaned and sewers constructed, schools were established, and public finances were put on a sound basis.

President McKinley sent a commission to the Philippines to study conditions there and render a report which would aid in establishing a civil government in the Islands. Jacob G. Schurman was to head the commission.

When Schurman arrived in the Philippines, he found the Filipinos in arms against the United States. Aguinaldo, whom Dewey had helped to get back to the Philippines from his exile in Asia for the purpose of fighting the Spaniards, had raised the standard of revolt against the Americans on February 4, 1899. To him and to most of the Filipinos, American rule was no more acceptable than Spanish rule.

The most severe test of American colonial policy and administration has been made in the Philippine Islands. The James Act and the liberal administration of Francis B. Harrison (1912-1921) gave impetus to the demand for immediate independence. Despite the report of the Wood-Forbes Commission (1921) and the Thompson Committee (1926) that the Islands were not ready for self-government, the agitation for independence continued both in the islands and in the United States. Those who opposed control by the United States on the ground that liberty was being denied to the Filipinos were joined by

others who argued that American financial investment in the island had been disappointing, that duty-free sugar from the Philippines was competing with American grown sugar on an unfair basis, that the islands had not enabled the United States to increase its trade with the Orient, and that they constituted a liability rather than an asset from the standpoint of national defence.[1]

United States influence in the Western Hemisphere. The attitude of the South American neighbors can be traced back to events that have taken place in history relating to United States and South America.

In the Clayton Bulwer Treaty (1850) the United States had agreed that any Isthmian canal should be under the joint guarantee of Great Britain and the United States. In the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, it was provided that the United States might build the canal and have full control and policing of it if its use was accorded to all nations on equal terms.[2]

The treaty above and the Hay-Herran Treaty of 1903 dealt with the United States and Panama. Congress had decided to build the canal across Panama, rather than across Nicaragua, and had offered the new Panama Canal Company

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[1] Faulkner, op. cit., p. 93.

[2] Ibid., p. 635.

$40,000,000 for the rights of the old French Company which had tried to construct a canal during the eighties. The Hay-Herran Treaty with Columbia was signed whereby Columbia granted the United States a ninety-nine year lease over a zone six miles wide in the province of Panama in return for $10,000,000 in cash and an annual rental of $250,000 beginning nine years after the agreement was ratified. The Columbia Senate, much to the disgust of President Roosevelt, refused to ratify the treaty, probably hoping to get better terms.

Columbia's rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty not only irritated the United States government, but it alarmed those who were interested in the new Panama Canal Company and it aroused patriotic Panamanians who feared the canal would be built in Nicaragua. In the summer of 1903 it was no surprise to American government when the revolution was started in Panama. The revolutionists were successful because the United States, basing its action on a treaty of 1846 with Columbia, maintained free and uninterrupted transit across the Isthmus. Actually, this action prevented the Columbian government from moving the necessary troops to quell the revolt.[1]

Two weeks after the revolution the United States

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[1]Owsley, op. cit., p. 378.

concluded a treaty with the republic of Panama, the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty (1903). President Theodore Roosevelt immediately recognized the new Republic of Panama. The new agreement granted to the United States in perpetuity the use of the canal zone ten miles wide, transferred to the United States government the properties of New Panama Canal Company and the Panama Railroad Company; awarded Panama $10,000,000 and an annuity of $250,000 for its concessions. After several false starts the construction of the canal went forward rapidly under the supervision of Colonel G.W. Gothals. Colonel W.C. Gorgas conquered the difficulties of sanitation in the Canal Zone. The first steamer passed through the canal in August, 1914.

Great Britain and Germany, endeavoring to collect debts owed to their citizens by the government of Venezuela, established a blockade of Venezuelan ports. President Roosevelt feared that the debt question might be made the pretext for a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. His diplomatic pressure behind the scenes, particularly against Germany, probably helped both nations to decide to agree to arbitration. Mixed commissions reviewed the claims against the South American republic and Venezuela agreed in 1903 to devote thirty per cent of its customs receipts to pay the valid claims. The Venezuelan incident was the occasion for the pronouncement by Luis Drago, Argentine minister for

foreign affairs, of the doctrine that no state has a right to make the pecuniary claims of its citizens against another state the pretext for military intervention. The United States State Department gave its support to the Drago Doctrine and at the Second Hague Conference, 1907, the United States delegation secured the adoption of a resolution that no nation should resort to armed force to recover the debts due its citizens unless the debtor nation refused arbitration, or having accepted arbitration, failed to yield to the decision.

When France, Italy, and Belgium threatened in 1904 to use force in collecting debts owed their citizens by the Dominican Republic, President Theodore Roosevelt announced that the United States would be compelled to intervene in the affairs of a neighbor republic in case of long-continued wrongdoing or failure to pay debts. Under this corollary of the Monroe Doctrine the administration negotiated a treaty with the Dominican Republic providing for control of the collection of the Dominican customs by the United States. When the Senate refused to ratify the treaty, Roosevelt put the receivership into effect by executive order. This manifestation of our "police power" was widely criticized in the United States and aroused grave apprehension throughout Latin America.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 383-386.

The United States in Eastern affairs. The years which followed the Spanish-American War found the interest and the power of the United States expanding in the Far East as well as in the Western Hemisphere. Annexation of the Philippine Islands had a great effect upon United States Far Eastern policy. As can be seen, one of the convincing arguments in favor of annexing the Philippines had been the nearness of the island to China and their advantage as a springboard for the development of trade with China. The United States soon found, however, that other countries were determined to get this trade for themselves. They were even trying to bring about the partition of China for their own benefit. Possession of the Philippines also affected the United States relations with Japan. It was apparent that there would be difficulty in defending the Philippines if the United States became involved in any Far Eastern conflict.

A vast empire covering a territory as large as the whole of Europe--China--was ruled by the Manchu Dynasty. The domination of the Manchu emperors was, however, somewhat shadowy. For all purposes of administration the heads of the eighteen provinces into which the country was divided were largely independent. Thus China was militarily weak. The Chinese did not want foreigners in their country. They believed that their civilization was infinitely superior to that of the Occident and wished to preserve it against outside

influences. To keep foreigners out of the country the government had restricted foreign trade to the port of Canton.

The Chinese lacked the military force to resist foreign encroachments. Consequently they were compelled to open more and more ports to foreign trade. The first ports were opened as a result of the Opium War. In addition to cotton, which was the principal article of trade with China, the British East India Company was selling in Canton considerable quantities of opium, a product of India which yielded large profits. For many years the Chinese took no action, but when the opium trade grew to such proportions that it caused widespread demoralization, Chinese officials tried to stop the importation of the drug. After various other measures had failed, the Chinese Imperial Commissioner in 1839 confiscated the opium held by some British merchants who at once called on the British government to avenge the insult to the British flag. The British fleet responded by smashing the forts at the entrance to the Canton River and British troops took possession of Canton and other maritime cities.

The Opium War was concluded by the treaty of Nanking, 1842, in which the Chinese government agreed to pay the British a large indemnity, cede the island of Hongkong to them, and open four additional ports to trade. France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and also the United States

quickly signed treaties giving them the same commercial rights. These concessions did not satisfy the European nations and the United States very long. In 1843 the British signed a commercial treaty which extended their privileges by setting land aside for their residence. A short time later both the United States and France, by a small display of force, secured similar advantages. These treaties mark the beginning of "the right of extraterritoriality", the right which gave foreigners immunity from Chinese jurisdiction. Thereafter the provision was incorporated in the treaties which all the western nations signed with China. Consequently no foreigner residing in China was subject to Chinese laws as regards either his person or his property. Any charge or claim against him had to be presented before the consul of his own country and was judged according to the laws of his nation. For a time efforts had been restricted to obtaining commercial and extraterritorial rights. During the succeeding decades various western powers proceeded to establish their domination over large sections of Chinese territory.

Through the conquest of Cochin China, Cambodia, Tonkin, and Annam, the French virtually laid claim to southern China. The British also extended their control by compelling China to recognize British sovereignty over Burma in 1886. Even the Japanese, encouraged by the example of the

western nations, forced China in the treaty which ended the Sino-Japanese War to turn over to her the Liatung Peninsula together with Port Arthur, acknowledge the independence of Korea, and surrender to Japan the island of Formosa. But the Russians, seeing in the presence of the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland an obstacle in their plans, compelled them by a threat of force and with the support of France and England to relinquish their claims. Thus, before the end of the nineteenth century the Chinese found themselves with their best ports leased to foreign nations and their coastal and inland trade controlled by foreigners.[1]

Alarmed by the activity of the European powers in establishing "spheres of influence" in China, Secretary Hay requested Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and Japan to agree to the principle of the "open door." His proposals included: (1) Noninterference with the twenty-two treaty ports in China; (2) Universal application of the Chinese tariff and harbor dues within any given "sphere" for merchants of all nations. The European powers reluctantly agreed to Hays' principle of equality of opportunity in China in commercial matters, thus insuring to American traders equality of treatment with the nationals of the countries which had received concessions from the Chinese government.

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[1]Ergang, op. cit., pp. 266-269.

The protection of the territorial integrity of China was incidental. The Boxer Rebellion, 1900, was the result of resentment of the Chinese against the commercial and financial exploitation of their country by foreigners. It resulted in an attack upon the foreign settlement in Peking by an anti-foreign society known as the Boxers.

At Secretary Hay's insistence an international relief force was organized which fought its way to Peking in time to save the majority of those beseiged in the legations. The United States assumed the lead in determining the punishment to be imposed upon China for the Boxer outrages, and succeeded in restraining those nations which desired to wreak vengeance upon the Celestial Empire. Again Hay demonstrated the extent of American interest and influence in world affairs.

In their search for lucrative trade connections, the western powers did not overlook Japan. But when they sought entry into that country they found the door tightly locked. A small but informed Japanese minority realized that their country, if it wished to escape domination by the western powers, must adopt the political, military, and economic systems of the west. The first major step was toward centralization of authority. The next steps were the end of feudalism, a new educational system, railroad construction, military reform, and a strong navy.

The Japanese developed an army aided by a combination of French and British military experts. The Japanese made a

treaty with Britain to keep them out of the Russo-Japanese War. Then, without making a declaration of war, they launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, February 8, 1904, and inflicted much damage. This time the world took the Japanese more seriously, but the general opinion was that an Asiatic people would stand little chance of victory in a war against Western military forces. However, the unprepared Russians were anything but a match for the Japanese. After bottling the Russian fleet up in the ports of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, they destroyed it bit by bit whenever ships ventured out into the open. On land the Japanese were equally successful against the ill-equipped Russian troops. While one army quickly drove the Russians out of Korea, another landed behind Port Arthur to keep supplies from reaching the main Russian army in Manchuria. The last of the great battles lasted from February 23 to March 16, 1905, and ended in a Russian defeat. Still the Russians did not make overtures for peace.

Finally, President Theodore Roosevelt, to prevent further bloodshed, requested the belligerent nations to send plenipotentiaries to a peace conference at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. In the treaty signed September 5, 1905, Russia agreed to transfer to Japan the lease on the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur and to cede to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin Island. No indemnity was paid by either side. The failure of Theodore Roosevelt to obtain indemnity from

Russia for Japan caused the Japanese to have ill-feeling toward the United States.[1]

World War I, which began in August, 1914, played directly into the hands of the Japanese imperialists. Japan immediately took advantage of the fact that Germany was unable to defend her possessions in the Far East. Before the end of 1914 she had taken not only Kiaochow, which China had leased to Germany, but also the German-held islands north of the Equator. Also taking advantage of the fact that the other European powers had to give their attention to the war, Japan presented China, in 1915, with the so-called Twenty-one Demands (for special privileges). The Twenty-one Demands were intended to close the Open Door and to make Japan supreme in China. Japanese policies of aggression alarmed the United States. Secretary of State Bryan bluntly notified Japan and China that the United States "cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which impairs the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy."[2] As a result of the United States protests, Japan gave up the extreme demands she had made on China. This policy helped to bring about Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 270-273.

[2] Canfield, op. cit., pp. 586-588.

United States and World War I. The shot that felled the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Serajevo on June 28, 1914, created only a flurry of excitement in the United States. Americans had heard the cry of "wolf" too often to believe that the pack was loose at last. But when it finally became evident that Europe was being drawn into war, the first reaction of the United States was to keep out of the senseless conflict.[1] "Peace-loving citizens of this country will rise up and tender a hearty vote of thanks to Columbus for having discovered America," declared the Chicago Herald. The Wabash Plain Dealer chimed in, "We never appreciated so keenly as now the foresight exercised by our forefathers in emigrating from Europe." The Literary Digest summed up newspaper reaction: "Our isolated position and freedom from entangling alliances inspire our press with the cheering assurance that we are in no peril of being drawn into the European quarrel."[2]

August 4, 1914, President Wilson issued a proclamation of neutrality. He cautioned citizens to commit no act to aid either side of the controversy. He declared the ports closed to belligerent warships, unless they came for assistance, in which case they were to leave in twenty-four hours and receive

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[1]Arthur Bullard, Diplomacy of the Great War (New York: Macmillan Company, 1917), p. 291.

[2]Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: F.S. Crofts and Company, 1946), p. 610.

coal and supplies only sufficient to take them to their nearest home ports. He also reminded the people that while they had the right to sell contraband articles to a belligerent, such articles were subject to seizure if intercepted at sea.[1]

The people of the United States could not be indifferent to the course of events in Europe. A hundred motives forced them to take sides--their neutral rights, their sympathies, their prejudices, indignation over the brutal invasion of Belgium, hatred of England, good will towards England, grateful remembrance for French support in the War for Independence, ties of blood, nationality.

No sooner was the war fairly under way than Germans, German-Americans and pro-German citizens began the most remarkable propaganda ever made by a belligerent and its supporters to influence opinion in a neutral country. The press, the platform, and the mails were used without restriction.[2]

The German propaganda in America devoted itself to a blackening of the fame of England and to a unification of the Germans in the United States. In the United States in 1910 there were 8,712,149 people either born in Germany or

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[1]Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, Inc., 1958), p. 276.

[2]Frederic L. Paxson, Recent History of the United States (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), pp. 436-437.

with one parent born there. Since the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia and the formation of the National German-American Alliance in 1902, the organization of this group had been tightened and extended. The Fatherland, a German newspaper, attempted to stress the anti-British feeling of the Americans of Irish extraction, who, since the Fenian movement, had consistently opposed acts of agreement with Great Britain and who were already partially organized in the American Truth Society to fight the rapprochement due to the termination of a hundred years of peace.[1] Most of the German propaganda came through the German Ambassador's office and it was not in any degree as well distributed in the United States as the Allied propaganda.[2]

Many American newspapers were in favor of the Allies' cause, so war tales of atrocities began to make the headlines. Headlines related the facts: Malines and Thermonde were burned; Louvain was sacked; its precious old library was destroyed by a people who for a century had called themselves the most devoted friends of scholarship; and the burgomaster and other leading citizens of Aerschot were executed because, it was reported, the burgomaster's son had resented the insult a drunken German officer offered to the burgomaster's daughter.

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[1] John Bach McMaster, The United States in the World War (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1918), pp. 23-24.

[2] John Sperner Bassett, Our War With Germany (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1919), p. 14.

On August 25 a Zeppelin dropped bombs on Antwerp, killing a number of people and destroying sixty houses. Shortly afterwards, a single aviator flew over Paris dropping bombs. On September 21 the newspapers told about the bombardment of Rheims, and day after day continued the story until it was not too much to say that the American people were able to see this magnificent work of art hacked to pieces bit by bit.[1]

Many historians and writers at that time and now believe that because of economic reasons the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies. To clarify this, Rose M. Stein in her book entitled M-Day relates:

> By a series of successive steps American business forced the country to enter the World War. The die was cast when on the first day of August, 1914, all the partners of J.P. Morgan and Co. were heart and soul for the Allies. The first step was acquiescence to the blockade and acceptance of the proposition to sell to only one of the belligerents. The next step was to ratify loans with which to pay for American goods delivered to the Allies. The final step was taken to save the loans and consequent collapse of American and world credit. Each step was taken by the Government reluctantly but was forced upon it as a condition for maintaining productive activity and economic prosperity.[2]

German submarine warfare was the immediate cause for American entry into the war, but American banks first forced the American government to authorize large loans to France

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[1] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

[2] Rose M. Stein, M-Day (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), p. 2.

and Great Britain. When those countries were faced with defeat, the American government was forced to enter to protect the bankers' investments. The high prices for food products brought great prosperity to the farmers, while the purchasers of war munitions stimulated industry and set factories going to full capacity.[1]

The estimated excess of American exports over imports for the entire year was $2,500,000,000 and the figure from December 1, 1914, to June 30, 1915, was only slightly less than $1,000,000,000.[2] It was felt that if European countries could not find the means to pay for the excess of goods sold them over those purchased from them they would have to stop buying and the export trade would shrink proportionately. The probable result would be restriction of output, industrial depression, idle capital, idle labor, numerous failures, financial demoralization, and general unrest and suffering among the laboring classes. The above reasons, historians state, were the reasons the United States loaned large sums of money to France and England, and shipped them large amounts of goods. Also the fact remains that Americans were economically dependent on trade with the Allies to maintain economic prosperity.

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[1]William Appleman Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1956), pp. 560-568.

[2]Ibid., p. 563.

Americans could not help taking sides. From the first the majority hoped the Allies would win. Cultural ties between the United States, Great Britain, and France were strong. They were the three great democracies. All three had similar ideals of justice, liberty, and the rights of the individual. All three stood for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The Central Powers, on the contrary, were autocracies. Their rulers resisted their people's efforts to gain self-government and oppressed the minority groups within their borders. Germany had aroused distrust by its ambitions in China, the East Indies, the Pacific, and Africa. Leaders of the Pan-German movement boasted that Germans were destined to dominate the world. As the war went on, more and more Americans felt that the cause of Britain and France was their cause too. Thousands of Americans enlisted under the British and French flags. Hundreds of thousands contributed to Allied war relief. On the other hand, there were nearly nine million Americans of German birth or parentage, and they tended to support their fatherland. In addition, many Americans of Irish descent were ready to cheer any foe of their ancient enemy, the British. Both sides tried to influence American opinion by means of propaganda, as was stated earlier in this paper. The Allies were far more effective in swaying Americans than were the Central Powers. This was partly due to British

control of the cables which carried news from Europe. Even more important was the widespread sympathy here with the Allied cause. Propaganda succeeds best when people want to believe it.[1]

Sympathy in this country for the Allied cause did not, however, prevent friction from arising between the British and American governments. The Allies were resolved to use their naval superiority to prevent the Central Powers from receiving outside supplies. The German navy was in control of the Baltic Sea and Germany therefore could carry on trade with the Scandinavian countries as well as with Holland and Denmark. Since these neutral countries served as backdoors for the admission of foreign goods into Germany, England could not carry out an effective blockade. She determined, however, to bring about the same result by other means. In so doing she adopted policies which the American government considered a violation of international law and an infringement of neutral rights.[2]

One such practice was the extension of the list of contraband articles beyond what, in American opinion, was allowed by international law. Among the unusual articles in this list were food products, which had been included for the

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[1]Walter Phelps Hall and Robert Greenhalgh Albion, A History of England and the British Empire (New York: Ginn and Company, 1953), p. 863.

[2]Bassett, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

alleged reason that the German government had taken over all grain and flour for distribution among civilians and servicemen. It was therefore impossible for the Allies to make a distinction between the food supplies intended for the civilian population and those that would go to the army.[1]

The seizure of contraband goods did not, however, stop the indirect trade with Germany through the adjacent neutral countries. American exports to Denmark, Holland, Norway and Sweden were increasing by leaps and bounds and the excess over normal times was going to Germany. To put a stop to this trade the Allied governments announced in March, 1915, that thereafter they would "detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin."[2]

All ships bound for countries adjoining Germany were searched and all cargoes seized which in the opinion of the inspectors would ultimately reach Germany, even though they were to be landed first at a neutral port. The countries adjacent to Germany were allowed a quota of imports equal to the amount received by them before the war. All amounts in excess of this quota were considered as going to Germany and were diverted to the Allies. This plan of rationing the northern neutrals was giving the doctrine of final destination

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Bailey, op. cit., pp. 636-637.

an unprecedented extension. This blockade of neutral ports met with strong objection from the United States and other neutrals. The United States contended that the methods employed by the Allies in carrying out their policies were not in keeping with international usage. Objection was also made to the allied practice of opening American letters going to continental Europe, on the ground of preventing helpful information from reaching Germany from America.[1]

The Allies attempted to justify their restraints on neutral commerce partly on the ground that they were in keeping with the spirit of international law and partly on the ground that they were measures in reprisal for Germany's violation of international law. These explanations were not accepted by neutrals as satisfactory reasons. The American State Department objected to these violations of neutral rights but did not in its opposition go beyond protests, which were filed only to serve as legal claims for damages at the end of the war. If it had resorted to economic pressure it could have brought England to terms. An embargo on arms and other materials needed by the Allies could have forced England to yield to the American government's demands. However, if President Wilson had employed this method of peaceable coercion he would have crippled the war effort of the Allies and helped the Central Powers towards a possible

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[1]Williams, op. cit., pp. 554-556.

victory. To Wilson, Lansing, and the other leading officials at Washington, such a victory would have been a calamity for the United States as well as a disaster to Europe. In their opinion the future prosperity and security of this country were bound up with the success of the Allied cause. Furthermore, an embargo would have worked a greater injury to American commerce than that caused by the Allied restrictions.[1]

The British authorities carried out the objectionable policy in such a way as to cause as little loss to individuals as possible. American ship-owners also soon learned how to adjust their plans to the Allied regulations without any great inconvenience. Also, the loss of the German market was more than compensated for by the increased demand of the Allies for American products. The ready sale of American goods at high prices in Allied markets was sustaining a marvelous prosperity in America. It could hardly be expected that the government would jeopardize this prosperity by going the limit in insisting on rights which at the time were academic rather than practical. In actual practice the Allied policy was hurting the pride more than the profits of the American people.[2]

Despite the patient restraint shown by the State

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[1] Ibid., pp. 548-549.

[2] Bailey, op. cit., pp. 616-619.

Department, at times relations became tense between the United States and the Allies. The ill feeling growing out of this friction was cumulative, and by the fall of 1916 public sentiment in the United States was veering away from the Allies. Even Wilson's patience was wearing thin. He had been disappointed over the refusal of the Allies to give favorable consideration to his peace offer, made in February of that year. Wilson's desire to act as peacemaker was now inspired by the wish to stop the bloodshed in Europe and also by the longing to spare his own country the horrors of war. In February, 1916, he proposed to the British foreign office that a conference be held to agree upon terms of peace. If Britain should agree to the proposal and Germany would not, the United States, he said, would probably leave the conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies. While the terms of peace would have to be agreed upon between the belligerents at the conference, Colonel House indicated that his government would support a settlement favorable to the Allies. Unfortunately, however, neither side was willing to accept peace without victory. Germany would not consider any terms which did not provide for indemnities. Britain did not even submit the proposal to her ally.[1] It caused Wilson to question whether the Allies were not as selfish as the Central Powers in their war aims. This

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[1]Paxson, op. cit., pp. 437-438.

feeling of disappointment was accentuated by the Allied announcement in July, 1916, of a blacklist which included eighty-five American establishments. All firms on this blacklist were denied the privilege of trade with firms in Allied countries.

During the first six months of the war the United States was involved in virtually no serious difficulties with Germany. It is a fact that these two nations were then contending with Great Britain for the freedom of the seas. But the mounting trade in war materials brought about a change. The Americans were not only shipping enormous quantities of munitions to the Allies with which to kill Germans, but were soon to advance the necessary money from their own pockets. The chief German propaganda newspaper in the United States cried: "We prattle about humanity, while we manufacture poisoned shrapnel and picric acid for profit. Ten thousand German widows, ten thousand orphans, ten thousand graves bear the legend 'made in America'."[1]

The American controversy with Germany began on February 4, 1915, at which time the German government issued a proclamation declaring the waters around the British Isles a war zone. All enemy ships found in this zone on and after February 18, 1915, were to be destroyed without its being

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[1]Bailey, op. cit., p. 623.

always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers on that account. The proclamation went on to say that even neutral ships would be exposed to danger in the war zone as in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 1st by the British government and of the accidents of naval war. It cannot always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed at enemy ships.[1] Neutral powers were accordingly forewarned not to continue to entrust their crews, passengers, or merchandise to such vessels. In short, this was a warning that neutrals would run a serious risk of losing their lives and their ships if they would venture into the war zone. The excuse given for this defiance of international law was that it was a retaliatory measure necessitated by Britain's restrictions on German trade. Great Britain had violated international law by declaring the North Sea a war area, by extending unreasonably the lists of contraband of war, and by refusing to abide by the Declaration of London. The Declaration of London was a set of rules of naval warfare agreed upon by representatives of the ten leading maritime states at a conference held in London in the winter of 1908-1909. The Declaration, however, had not been ratified by all the countries represented at the conference and therefore did

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[1]Bassett, op. cit., pp. 39-41.

not have the binding force of international law. Great Britain was one of the powers which had not ratified the principles of the Declaration although her representatives had signed it. She refused to accept it because the restrictions would bear most heavily upon her. She especially objected to those clauses dealing with contraband of war.[1]

The United States government felt that it could not accept this infringement of its rights as a neutral and so protested vigorously against the proposed policy in a note dated February 10, 1915. It took the position that a belligerent's rights as to neutral ships on the high seas are confined to visit and search unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained. The proclamation did not provide for that, so Germany had no warrant under international law to sink an American ship. The note sounded a clear note of warning to the German government, stating that in case American ships or lives were destroyed, the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accounting for such acts of their naval authorities.[2]

A way out of the difficulty was suggested by the American State Department. Shortly after the "strict accountability" note was sent, Secretary Bryan in identical

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[1] McMaster, op. cit., pp. 51, 63 and 71.

[2] Bailey, op. cit., p. 625.

notes to Germany and England on February 20th suggested that Germany agree to restrict her mine-laying practices and submarine attacks on merchant vessels, and that Britain stop the use of neutral flags and allow foodstuffs to go into Germany. At first both sides seemed indifferent to the proposal. Later, however, after the sinking of the Lusitania, the British Cabinet was favorably disposed toward it. However, when Ambassor Gerard submitted the proposal to the German foreign office he was informed that the German government would not consider it unless raw materials as well as food were given free access to Germany. The Minister of Foreign Affairs also added that Germany was in no need of food.[1]

The policy announced by the German foreign office was clearly a violation of international law. The Central Powers were not maintaining an effective blockade of the British Isles, as numerous vessels came to and went from the British ports after the announcement of the new policy. Germany, therefore, did not even have the right to seize a neutral vessel on the high seas unless it carried a cargo of contraband. A belligerent did have, however, the right to seize enemy merchant ships and even to destroy them, provided it was not feasible to bring them before a prize court.

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[1]McMaster, op. cit., pp. 75 and 76.

There had also been precedent in favor of the right of a belligerent to destroy, in extreme cases, neutral vessels carrying contraband; but, in all cases, no merchant vessel, neutral or enemy, could be destroyed until adequate provision had been made for the safety of all persons on board. Germany's defense of her policy rested on the contention that the submarine cannot be effective if international law is observed, and, therefore, an exception ought to be made in its favor. The American government took the position that the dictates of humanity and the time-honored principles of international law should be upheld even at the cost of submarine efficiency. The fact that the submarine was placed at a disadvantage by virtue of England's sea methods did not in the least relieve Germany of the obligation to respect the right accorded to neutrals by international law. The United States was in no way responsible for, nor obligated to relieve the embarrassment in which the submarine was placed by British practices, even if those practices had over-stepped the limits prescribed by international law.[1]

Germany proceeded to act upon the policy outlined in her note of February 4. Beginning February 18, 1915, the submarine zone became effective. One after another, German torpedoes sent American ships to the bottom. On

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[1]Stein, op. cit., pp. 6-11.

March 28, 1915, the British passenger liner Falaba was sunk. Only one American person was lost. Then on May 1, the American tanker Gulfight was torpedoed and three Americans lost their lives. Regardless of this, American passengers continued to venture into the submarine zone on munitions-laden British liners. Secretary of State Bryan urged the President to take steps to stop this practice. President Wilson held to his firm belief that Americans had the right to travel on belligerent ships.[1]

These minor grievances were soon reduced to comparative unimportance by the greater issue created by the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915. The Lusitania had made several trips across the Atlantic in defiance of the German blockade. When she was about to sail from New York on May 1, 1915, an advertisement appeared in the New York papers over the signature of the German embassy warning travelers that they were at their own risk if they traveled by British ships in the waters around the British Isles. Some people heeded the warning and canceled their sailings at the last moment, but most of the passengers treated the advertisement as a joke. The ship carried 1250 passengers and 667 crew. She was not armed but carried in her hold 4200 cases of cartridges for small-arms, 1271 empty shrapnel cases, a small quantity of contraband, besides a large amount of

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[1]Bailey, op. cit., p. 625.

foodstuff.[1]

On May 7 when the ship was eight miles off Old Head of Kinsale, the south coast of Ireland, she was struck by two torpedoes discharged from a German submarine. In about eighteen minutes she went down bow first. No warning was given. Many of the passengers were at luncheon; but in a few minutes before she sank some of the passengers found refuge in ten life boats. The wireless operator sent call after call for help. Tugs, steam trawlers, and every available vessel was hurried down from Queenstown. Of the 1,918 human beings on board, 1,153 were drowned. Of the 188 Americans, 114 men, women and children lost their lives. Among them were many men well known in their walks of life.[2]

No event since the sinking of the Maine so stirred the country. A cry of horror and rage rose from every part of the country. Beyond all doubt, it was said, the destruction of the Lusitania was carefully and deliberately planned. It was later found that the warning notice in the newspapers had been preceded by anonymous letters and telephone messages to many of the passengers. American citizens traveling peacefully had been sent to their death by the deliberately planned act of Emperor William and his advisers.[3] By the German language press the deed was justified. Said one

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[1]Bassett, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

[2]McMaster, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

[3]Ibid., pp. 90-91.

Journal, "War is war. A nation forced to fight for life against a world of enemies should not be guided by sentiment." The Lusitania, loaded to its capacity with explosives, ammunition, war material, was to the Germans a warship. To accept passengers under such circumstances was a crime of the worst kind. Considering the cargo, some of it was liable to explode at the slightest shock. Therefore, it might be that an explosion destroyed the Lusitania. Some of the survivors told of the asphyxiating gases. Torpedoes do not produce them.[1]

There was a strong feeling, especially in the East, that the United States should declare war at once. Wilson probably could have led the country into war at that time, just as Jefferson could have done a century earlier, when the Chesapeake was attacked by the Leopard. Wilson, however, decided that he would not be stampeded into war. He wished to spare his people the horrors of war, if possible. Furthermore, the country was not prepared for war, either militarily or psychologically. In certain sections, especially of the South and West, the prevailing sentiment at that time was not in favor of war. A war over the Lusitania would probably not have had behind it the unanimous sentiment without which no nation should ever risk the uncertain outcome of armed conflict. Wilson decided to try negotiations

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[1] Ibid., pp. 92-93.

as a means of upholding American rights. He took a firm position in demanding that the German government change the act and apologize for it; make provisions for a just indemnity for the loss of American lives; and give guarantees for the future safety of American citizens on the high seas.[1]

The negotiations were continued for several months and finally resulted in a diplomatic victory for the United States. During this long period of negotiation Wilson was at times the target of much hostile criticism by the advocates of sterner measures who complained that he was clicking the typewriter when he should have been rattling the sword.

In the course of the negotiations over the Lusitania, three vigorous notes of protest and warning were sent from the American State Department to the German foreign office. The first of these, prepared by Wilson with the aid of Robert Lansing, Counselor of the State Department, was reluctantly signed by Secretary Bryan. The latter felt that the President's policy was too aggressive and might lead to war. Germany, he believed, had a right to prevent contraband going to the Allies, and ships carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to protect her from attack. He also wanted to submit the dispute with Germany to arbitration and send a note of protest to Britain before dispatching the second note to Germany. President Wilson did not accept

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[1]Commager, op. cit., pp. 282-283.

these suggestions but continued a vigorous policy toward Germany. His position was that if the American government should accept a single abatement of right many other humiliations would follow, and the whole international law might crumble piece by piece. The second Lusitania note was so strong that Bryan could not conscientiously sign it. He therefore resigned his post and was succeeded by Lansing.[1]

While the Lusitania case was still under discussion, another serious case of dispute arose between Germany and the United States. On August 19, 1915, the British unarmed steamer, Arabic, was torpedoed by a German submarine near the place of the destruction of the Lusitania. It was bound for New York, was unarmed, carried no contraband, and was sunk without warning. A considerable number of the crew and passengers, including two Americans, lost their lives. The German foreign office seemed to appreciate the seriousness of the situation and to fear that the American government would take a determined stand against this act. Consequently, Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador to Washington, in a communication to Secretary Lansing in reply to his last Lusitania note, declared that he had been instructed to make for his government the pledge that German submarines would not in the future sink liners unless they would resist attack or try to escape, until adequate provision had been made for

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[1]Williams, op. cit., pp. 547-548 and 586-587.

the safety of noncombatants. This pledge, while not a settlement of the Lusitania case, was an acceptance of the main point contended for by Wilson and therefore made possible a more leisurely future negotiation. Later, the German government declared its willingness to disavow the sinking of the Arabic and pay indemnities for the American lives lost.[1]

For six months the German navy observed the pledge given in the Arabic case, and during this time there was no serious trouble between the two governments. The first dangerous menace to this peaceful relation was the attack on the Sussex. The Sussex, an unarmed French steamer, was torpedoed without warning in the British Channel on March 24, 1916, and about eighty noncombatant passengers of all ages and sexes, including citizens of the United States, were killed or injured. This act evoked a strong protest from President Wilson, who regarded the attack as a plain violation of the Arabic pledge. Secretary Lansing, with the President's approval, sent a stiff note to the German foreign office which declared that:

> Unless the Imperial German Government should not immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States could have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Government altogether.[2]

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[1]Bailey, op. cit., p. 634.

[2]Bassett, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

This threat of a break in diplomatic relations seemed to bring the German government to a realization of the gravity of the situation. The German foreign minister was now convinced that the American government had reached the limit of its patience. If a break in diplomatic relations were to be avoided he would have to agree to Wilson's demands. Accordingly, the German government yielded, although with very bad grace. In a note the German government made the following announcement:

> The German Government notifies the government of the United States that the German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless those ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.[1]

With this pledge was coupled the statement that Germany counted on America's inducing Great Britain to observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war, and, if the United States should fail to induce all the belligerents to follow the laws of humanity, Germany would reserve her liberty of action. The American State Department ignored the ugly tone of the German reply and accepted it as a virtual compliance with its demands. The government was committed to a policy that might lead to war.

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[1]Bailey, op. cit., p. 634.

Whether the United States would remain neutral or be drawn into the conflict would now depend upon the future conduct of Germany.[1]

The German government had two alternatives: one, to make peace; or, the other, to declare an all-out submarine warfare. President Wilson then tried to use the high offices of the United States government to make peace. The results of this peace were discussed earlier in this paper. It is enough to say that both sides were not willing to agree to any peace settlement as of yet.

Congress was aided in making up its mind on the question of arming American merchantmen by an important document which had just come into possession of the State Department. This was a telegram addressed to Von Eckhard, German Minister to Mexico, by Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, who had succeeded Von Jagow as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In this telegram Dr. Zimmermann stated that Germany would soon resume ruthless submarine warfare and that the United States might in consequence be drawn into the war. In case the United States should enter the war against Germany, Von Eckhard was to try to form an alliance between Germany and Mexico. Financial support could be promised Mexico, and she would be encouraged by Germany to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. This message had been intercepted by the British Naval Intelligence and forwarded to

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[1] Ibid., p. 635.

the American government.[1]

The Zimmermann note was preceded by a German note from Count Von Bernstorff which stated that Germany was going to use all-out submarine warfare. At this the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany but did not declare war on Germany as of yet. After the Zimmermann note, President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war and he received it. One of the reasons that Germany released an all-out submarine warfare was that they thought the United States might not declare war, and, if she did, Germany could win the war in Europe before the United States could aid Europe.

IV. UNIT PROCEDURES

The following sections contain lists of recommended procedures to be used in connection with the unit.

Initiatory activities.

1. Have the students plan a bulletin board display of clippings and cartoons which illustrate important world problems facing the United States. Discuss the display with the class with questions such as these in mind:
   A. Are these world problems complicated?

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[1]Bassett, op. cit., pp. 105-110.

B. Are America's domestic and foreign problems sometimes interrelated?

C. What is the role of self-interest in these world problems?

D. Do any public opinion polls deal with any of the issues involved in the display? If so, does the policy of the government agree with the opinion of the majority of those polled?

E. Is the United States employing its great power actively and intelligently in the solution of these problems?

2. Have the students discuss the role of the citizen in the formulation of foreign policy, particularly in a democracy such as the United States. The following problems are suggested:

A. How does the citizen exert pressure on his government?

B. Discuss types of pressure groups, such as racial, political, labor, business, veterans.

C. Lord Bryce observed more than sixty years ago that public opinion "leads the politicians, not vice versa." What does this mean? Give examples.

3. The sympathy of the American people has invariably gone out to democracies whenever they have become

involved in war with monarchies and dictatorships. Give examples. The first three chapters in the Man in the Street by Thomas A. Bailey are helpful.

4. Point out that recent polls have shown that as one goes lower in the educational system one finds more jingoism, more militarism, more provincialism, more isolationism, more indifference to foreign affairs, more race prejudice, and more reluctance to pay public servants adequate salaries. Ask the students how they and the school can more effectively accept their responsibility in this tremendous job of public education which needs to be done.
5. Comment on special sources of information helpful to students of international affairs. The World Affairs Center of the University of Iowa has a large supply of free or inexpensive pamphlets on current world problems. Make a display of such materials.
6. In our thinking we should learn to put ourselves in the other fellow's shoes, and to view a problem as he would see it through the lenses of his racial psychology and national bias. With this in mind, invite a foreign student from one of the many colleges to talk to the class.

7. The film, "World War I: The Background", or the filmstrip, "The Rise of America as a World Leader", may be used as an introductory film.
8. The film, "World War I", may be shown to the class to stimulate interest for the study of the unit.

Developmental activities.

1. On a Mercator projection, show the class the apparent distances which separate the United States east coast from Europe and its west coast from Asia. Note also the size of Greenland as compared with South America. Chalk these relationships on a globe. Have the class draw conclusions as to how the widespread use of the Mercator maps of the world in American schools may have fostered isolationist sentiment.
2. Have a student make a careful study of American history during the period of the Articles of Confederation, noting especially the reasons why the central government was unable to prevent strife between states. Then have the class draw conclusions which might be relevant to the problems of world government, particularly in its effort to prevent strife between nations.
3. Have several students prepare a Dictionary of Terms peculiar to diplomatic history, including such

expressions as persona non grata, dollar diplomacy, status quo ante bellum, and recognition.

4. Ask a student to imagine that he is a member of Congress in 1898. One of his fellow representatives has made a speech urging a declaration of war on Spain. The student should prepare and give to the class a reply opposing the declaration.
5. Differences between countries are usually settled by (a) war, (b) negotiation, (3) arbitration, or (d) submission of grievances to a recognized international body. Using these headings, have students prepare a chart summarizing the major international differences since 1898 to 1917 to which the United States was a party.
6. Panel topic: Was the United States justified in going to war against Germany in 1917?
7. Using parallel columns, a student should compare the positions of the United States, England, France, and Germany in the years 1914-1917 with the position of each regarding the rights and duties of neutral nations.
8. The class as a group should try to define Manifest Destiny.
9. On a blackboard map of the United States ask a student to show the acquisitions of territory

between 1803-1898. He should indicate by different types of shading how the territory was acquired--that is, by purchase, by negotiation, or by force. A timeline might properly accompany the map. Then the class might concern itself with this question: Was the spread of the United States westward to the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean region an example of imperialism?

10. Have a student show in some graphic way the importance of the Panama Canal to America and to world trade.

11. Where possible, some student should consult a newspaper file to obtain a vivid impression of the intense feeling in the United States over the Cuban situation in 1898.

12. As an American newspaper correspondent in Cuba in 1897, some student might write a special article describing the Spanish cruelties under the reconcentration policy.

13. Panel topic: Was the United States justified in going to war against Spain in 1898? Arguments may be given by an imperialist, an anti-imperialist, and a humanitarian.

14. Panel topic: Straits and canals of great strategic importance should be under international control.

15. Town meeting topic: Should the United States be proud of its record as a colonial administrator?

Have student "experts" present the arguments for and against the United States in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. After these presentations, the whole class should be brought into the discussion.

16. Have the class discuss this question: In what ways was the Open Door Policy for the Far East different from the Monroe Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere?

17. Have a student make a timeline for the events from June 28, 1914 to April 6, 1917. He should place asterisks before those events which he believes contributed to America's declaration of war. He should defend his point of view before the class.

18. Have a student draw a diagram to show the organization of the State Department. Have another student draw a diagram showing how the various branches of America's national government influence foreign policy. A study of these diagrams will reveal a number of problems which might well involve the class in serious discussion. Would it be better to have treaties ratified by an absolute majority of both houses rather than by two-thirds majority of the Senate? Should the President be allowed to veto items in a bill without rejecting it completely? Should the Secretary of

State be permitted to make personal appearances before Congress to answer questions that had been previously submitted?

Culminating activities.

1. In the light of this Unit's study, discuss in class these points of view:
   A. Self-interest is the basis of all foreign policies.
   B. Physical force is the final determinant in diplomacy.
   C. Power imposes responsibilities.
   D. Diplomacy requires the services of our ablest men.
2. Have the class summarize the history of American diplomacy under the following headings:
   A. The influences which have shaped our foreign policy between the years 1889-1917.
   B. The specific fundamental foreign policies of the United States which developed between 1898-1917.
   C. Foreign policy in the future.
3. Students may wish to prepare a letter on some aspect of foreign policy to be sent to their congressmen or senator.
4. Give the class a test on understandings developed in

this unit. In addition, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the unit with the students.

5. The following films and filmstrips may be shown to summarize this unit: (1) "World War I", (2) "International Responsibility", (3) "World Power Responsibility", (4) "The New Freedom and World War I".

V. MATERIALS TO BE USED

The materials listed in the following sections are for use with the proposed unit.

Bibliography for the students.

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B. PAPERBACK BOOKS

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Carter, Gwendolen M. and John H. Herz. Government and Politics in the Twentieth Century. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961.

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Wigan, Joseph E. The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press. New York: Columbia University Press, 1934.

Wilkerson, Marcus M. Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1932.

Williams, William Appleman. The Shaping of American Diplomacy. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1956.

Audio-Visual Materials.

Films

Public Opinion in a Democracy (Sound, 10 minutes, color or black and white). Coronet Films, Coronet Building, Chicago 1, Illinois. This film shows the power of public opinion in the United States.

Causes and Immediate Effects of the First World War (Sound, 23 minutes, black and white). International Geographic Pictures, 1776 Broadway, New York 19, New York.

Panama (Sound, 16 minutes, black and white). McGraw-Hill Book Company, Textbook Film Department, 330 West 42nd Street, New York 18, New York. This film shows the progress of the Canal over the years.

Panama Canal (Sound, 15 minutes, black and white). General Electric Company, Electronics Division, Syracuse, New York. This film tells about the building of the Panama Canal.

Philippines, the Gateway to the Far East (11 minutes, black and white). Coronet Films, Coronet Building, Chicago 1, Illinois. This film shows the past history, present activities and direction of the future growth of the Philippines.

United States Expansion Overseas 1898-1917 (13½ minutes, color). Coronet Films, Coronet Building, Chicago 1, Illinois. This film reviews United States expansion into the Hawaiian Islands, Cuba, Philippines and countries of Central America.

Imperialism and European Expansion (13½ minutes, color). Coronet Films, Coronet Building, Chicago 1, Illinois. Nationalism, industrial rivalry, technological progress, search for cheap raw materials and missionary activities are shown as they affected the character of the imperial expansion movement of 1875-1914.

World War I: The Background (13½ minutes, color). Coronet Films, Coronet Building, Chicago 1, Illinois. This film reviews the basic causes and international incidents which led to war, with particular attention given to the Balkan conflict.

World War I (28 minutes, black and white). Encyclopedia Britannica Films, Inc., Wilmette, Illinois. This film is a documentary of the role of the United States.

Admiral Dewey's Victory at Manila (26 minutes, black and white). McGraw Hill, Text-Film Department,

330 West 42nd Street, New York 36, New York. This film shows the naval victory at Manila Bay and the occupation of the city itself.

Yellow Jack (29 minutes, black and white). Teaching Film Custodians, Inc., 25 West 43rd Street, New York 63, New York. This film tells of the fight against disease in the Spanish-American War.

Film Strips

The Rise of America as a World Leader. Yale University Press, Film Service, 386 4th Avenue, New York 16, New York.

Woodrow Wilson. Pictorial Events, 597 5th Avenue, New York 17, New York.

International Responsibility. (1900-1912). Society for Visual Education, Inc., 1345 Diversey Parkway, Chicago 14, Illinois.

World Power Responsibility. (1876-1900). Society for Visual Education, Inc., 1345 Diversey Parkway, Chicago 14, Illinois.

The New Freedom and World War I (1913-1918). Society for Visual Education, Inc., 1345 Diversey Parkway, Chicago 14, Illinois.

America as a World Power Before 1918. Society for Visual Education, Inc., 1345 Diversey Parkway, Chicago 14, Illinois.

VI. EVALUATING THE UNIT

There is no part of the teaching process more sensitive than testing. If a test calls for factual information it shows that teachers are putting emphasis on factual information which they hope will be retained by the students until the examination.

If the objectives--understandings, skills and abilities, etc.--are stated concisely and specifically enough a teacher cannot be guilty of failing to test for these objectives.

It must be decided what the test is to accomplish. It is believed much emphasis has been given to one out of four purposes. Four basic purposes of tests are:

1. To measure the effectiveness of what is taught. To tell the teacher how well he is dealing with the students.
2. To increase the impact of instruction on the students.
3. To aid what is taught and how it is taught. It is also a check on good teaching. If students do poorly, the way ideas are presented may be at fault, or concepts may be too difficult.
4. To rank students according to achievement. This is very important, but it is not the only purpose.

Following are suggestions for evaluation procedures.

Essay Test. Discuss the following questions, using facts to back up generalization:

1. Why was the United States involved in the Cuban situation of 1898?
2. What was the Spanish-American War?
3. What effects did the Spanish-American War have?
4. What were the United States methods of imperialism?
5. What were the United States views towards Latin America?
6. What was the United States stand in Eastern affairs?
7. What events forced the United States into war with the Axis Powers?

Panel Discussions. Panel discussions are one way in which the students' attitude and ideas may be expressed. Some possible topics for a panel discussion are:

1. Should the United States have entered World War I?
2. Every country in the world must have democracy in order for the people to be content.
3. Was the United States justified in going to war against Spain in 1898?
4. Straits and canals of great strategic importance should be under international control.

Oral Examination. By observation in class it is possible to determine whether the students have developed a

favorable attitude towards democracy. It is also possible to tell by class response the extent to which students know the material and understand it. This can be reflected in class discussion and general attitude of the students.

CHAPTER III

SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to develop a resource unit for the teaching of the development of the United States diplomatic relations from the Spanish-American War to the entrance of the United States into World War I, for use by the high school history teacher.

The resource unit was selected as the basis for organization so the American history teacher could be provided with various sources of available materials for the planning of his own teaching units.

In the gathering and organization of materials dealing with United States international relations, high school American history textbooks were first surveyed. It was found that these in general gave incomplete treatment of this area. This necessitated the use of college texts to present a more adequate treatment of the selected historical problem.

The unit has been presented in Chapter II. The following outline was used.

I. Overview of the unit

II. Objectives to be sought from the unit

III. Contents of the unit

IV. Unit procedures

A. Initiatory activities

B. Developmental activities

C. Culminating activities

V. Materials to be used

A. Reading materials

1. Bibliography for the teacher

2. Bibliography for the students

B. Audio-visual materials

VI. Evaluating the unit

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